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1.  TRANSPARENCY THROUGH INSURANCE: MANDATES DOMINATE DISCRETION 
 
Tom Baker* 
 
This chapter describes how liability insurance has contributed to 
the transparency of the civil justice system.  The chapter makes three 
main points.  First, much of what we know about the empirics of the 
civil justice system comes from access to liability insurance data and 
personnel.  Second, as long as access to liability insurance data and 
personnel depends on the discretion of liability insurance 
organizations, this knowledge will be incomplete and, most likely, 
biased in favor of the public policy agenda of the organizations 
providing discretionary access to the data.  Third, although mandatory 
disclosure of liability insurance data would improve transparency, a 
reasonably complete understanding of the empirics of the civil justice 
system also requires mandatory disclosure of the payments and defense 
expenditures that are not covered by liability insurance.  
The first part of this chapter describes existing approaches to 
transparency through liability insurance in the U.S.  The second part 
analyzes the role of liability insurance in promoting transparency in 
several discrete civil justice arenas – auto, medical, and products 
liability – and, for comparison purposes, workers’ compensation.  The 
concluding section addresses objectives to expanding mandatory claims 
reporting and links the discussion in this chapter to the literature on 
the relationship between liability and insurance more generally.  
EXISTING APPROACHES TO TRANSPARENCY THROUGH LIABILITY INSURANCE  
The terms “transparency” and “civil justice system” require 
definition.  For present purposes, “transparency” refers to the degree 
to which the system is open to public view for (a) direct observation 
____________ 
* University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Thank you to Ina Ebert, 
Christian Lahnstein, James Macdonald, Robert Reville, and Charles Silver 
for comments and helpful discussion. 
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and (b) systematic analysis by researchers so that general 
understandings about the operation of the system can be drawn.  For 
present purposes, the “civil justice system” refers to the institutions 
centrally involved in providing redress for individuals who have been 
harmed in some way that is recognized as compensable through tort or 
related liability law.  Under this expansive definition, the civil 
justice system includes courts, law firms, governmental legal offices or 
agencies (such as state attorney general offices), parts of the 
organized bar, other organizations that assist claimants or defendants, 
and liability insurance institutions. Massively repeat players such as 
health insurance and workers’ compensation organizations (which have 
subrogation rights in thousands of claims) and defendants with very 
large claims portfolios (such as utilities and governmental entities) 
might also appropriately be regarded as part of the civil justice 
system, not just users of the system, particularly when they develop 
specialized organizational structures for the resolution of claims for 
civil redress.   
These definitions help make clear that liability insurance is both 
part of the civil justice system and also a window through which to 
observe other parts of the system.  Liability insurance institutions 
themselves can be more or less transparent, and they can provide a more 
or less transparent window on many aspects of the civil justice system: 
the aggregate sums transferred through different categories of claims 
over time, the amounts paid to different categories of victims, the 
timing of the resolution of different categories of claims, the fees 
paid to plaintiffs and defense counsel, and the amount and distribution 
of settlement payments to subrogating first party insurers, to name just 
a few topics that could be illuminated through access to insurance 
industry data. 
Liability insurance contributes to the transparency of the civil 
justice system in the U.S. through the following channels: (1) 
discretionary access to insurance company data and personnel; (2) public 
access to data collected and analyzed by insurance industry information 
service providers; (3) public access to the financial reports filed with 
regulatory authorities; and (4) public access to the mandatory claim 
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level reporting required in the medical liability arena.  The following 
sections describe each of these.    
Discretionary Access to Liability Insurance Company Information 
The liability insurance industry has a long history of providing 
information to civil justice researchers on a voluntary basis.  H. 
Laurence Ross’s renowned study of automobile liability law-in-action was 
possible only because two major auto insurance companies permitted him 
to observe and interview their automobile insurance adjusters (Ross, 
1970).  Most of the medical liability closed claims studies were 
possible only because medical liability insurers provided access to 
researchers. (Summarized in Baker, 2005a; see also Studdert et al., 
2006).  Liability insurers have provided civil justice researchers with 
computerized claims data that have made it possible to assess the impact 
of legal rules on litigation and settlement (e.g. Yoon 2001, Yoon and 
Baker, 2006).  In addition, liability insurance industry personnel have 
participated in qualitative civil justice research and in survey 
research  (Baker, 2001; Carroll et al., 2005; Pace et al.; 2007, Baker 
and Griffith, 2007) 
At the same time, however, the liability insurance industry has a 
long history of refusing to provide information to civil justice 
researchers.  For a researcher, the process of obtaining access to 
insurance company information is time consuming and uncertain at best.  
One risk-averse person in a long chain of command is enough to stop any 
research project.  And who, really, can blame that risk-averse person?  
Granting researchers access to insurance company data is a public 
service that is unlikely to provide any private benefit to the company 
that provides the access.   
Liability insurers benefit from greater understanding of the 
operation of the civil justice system and, thus, granting access to 
researchers can be understood in some cases as one insurer’s 
contribution to the success of the industry as a whole. In other cases, 
the decision makers in the company may be curious or public-spirited, 
and the public access may be understood as a form of charitable 
contribution.  In either event, however, case-by-case decisions by 
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individual insurance companies to provide voluntary access to civil 
justice researchers cannot serve as a reliable foundation for civil 
justice transparency, as important as that access in fact has been to 
some researchers. (e.g., Rolph et al., 2007)  
Discretionary access to liability insurance data cannot serve as a 
reliable foundation for two structural reasons that have nothing to do 
with the limits of the data.  First, liability insurers derive a 
competitive advantage from having better data than the competition, and 
they cannot be reasonably expected to give away that advantage.  Better 
data allows pricing that is more finely attuned to the risk, providing a 
competitive advantage in the adverse selection “arms race” at the 
underwriting stage of the insurance relationship (Baker 2003, and better 
data should lead to a better understanding of the claims environment, 
providing a competitive advantage in selecting and pricing claims for 
settlement.    
Second, the liability insurance organizations have interests at 
stake in public policy debates that can be affected by research on the 
civil justice system.  Those interests provide an incentive to be 
selective in granting discretionary access to data.  Research that rests 
on voluntarily provided data is very likely to be biased in favor of the 
perceived interests of the organization providing the data – for the 
very human and very understandable reason that people are more likely to 
give things to people who they see as allies.  A researcher whose prior 
research is seen as contrary to an insurer’s public policy agenda is 
much less likely to be given access to data than a researcher whose 
prior research is seen as helpful to that agenda.  
Public Access to Insurance Industry Information Service Providers 
Liability insurers need to understand the civil justice system in 
order to price insurance and manage claims.  Thus, it is hardly 
surprising that the industry collects and analyzes civil justice data.  
Some of these data are shared among insurance companies, typically 
through insurance industry information service providers.  This 
information is generally not available to civil justice researchers, 
however, and, thus, does not contribute to civil justice transparency.   
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Traditionally, the most important liability insurance industry 
service provider in the U.S. has been the Insurance Services Office 
(ISO), Inc., which collects and analyzes a wide variety of liability 
insurance data.1  ISO also serves for some purposes as the interface 
between insurance companies and the regulatory authorities and, thus, 
fills a quasi-regulatory role. ISO collects individual claim level data 
from member companies but it does not make those data available to 
researchers.  ISO uses the data to estimate prospective loss costs that 
members can use for pricing purposes and to provide required information 
to state insurance regulatory authorities.   
The ISO database is not designed to be a policy or individual-
claim-level database but rather a company-level database. Thus, it 
appears that the ISO data would be useful for estimating trends in 
aggregate claim costs within and among member companies on a state-by-
state basis.  This could be very useful for studying the impact of 
state-level changes in liability law, among other civil justice topics 
of interest. ISO regards the individual and company-level data as 
confidential and does not make it available to researchers, however.  
ISO does prepare reports using the aggregate information and would 
consider on a case-by-case basis whether to permit researchers to use 
the aggregate data. 
The Insurance Research Council (IRC) is a significant exception to 
the general rule of refusing to grant civil justice researchers access 
to data.  The IRC has played a major role in increasing the transparency 
of automobile accident claiming, the largest part of the liability 
insurance market.   
Every five years since 1987, the IRC has collected and then 
published two significant claims-level data sets. The first data set in 
each year is closed-claim data provided by auto insurance companies that 
collectively account for 65 – 70 % of auto insurance by premium volume.  
Each participating company establishes a two-week window in the spring 
and fills out a form for every auto claim closed with payment during 
____________ 
1 Information about ISO is based on a phone conversation with ISO 
government affairs official Mary Size, October 3, 2007. 
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that window.  The result is a closed-claim file with about 80,000 claims 
for each year.   
The second data set is a survey of a nationally representative 
panel of consumers from approximately the same time as the claims data 
are collected.  The IRC survey asks a variety of questions about 
consumption patterns, including whether anyone in the household was 
injured in an auto accident in the previous three years.  If so, the 
participants are asked questions about injuries, claims, and 
compensation.  These data provide information on other sources available 
for compensation for auto injuries, on injuries that do not produce an 
auto insurance claim, and on injuries from claims that are dropped or 
denied.  Both data sets have been useful to civil justice researchers 
(e.g., Carroll and Abrahamse, 2001). 
C. Access to Mandatory Financial Reporting 
Public Insurance companies admitted to do business in the U.S. must 
provide financial reports to the insurance regulatory authorities.  The 
regulatory authorities aggregate this financial information and provide 
public access under the auspices of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The underlying, company-by-company data 
are available for purchase, and researchers have made good use of these 
data to study trends in the civil justice system costs and the effects 
of state level legal changes  (Born and Viscusi, 1998). In addition, a 
variety of information service providers purchase this financial 
information and repackage it in forms that can be useful to civil 
justice researchers.  For example, Best’s Aggregates and Averages has 
long provided aggregate financial information about a substantial part 
of the civil justice system that is very useful for monitoring trends in 
liability costs over time (Baker, 2005b). 
All of these financial data have very serious limitations, however, 
relating to the fact that the underlying financial reports are designed 
to allow insurance regulators to monitor the solvency of liability 
insurance companies and in some cases to assess insurance company rating 
plans, not to provide civil justice transparency.  This design objective 
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affects the data in many ways, only three of which will be described 
here. 
First, the financial reports contain more detailed information 
about “incurred” losses than they do about either “developed” losses or 
paid claims. Incurred losses are accounting entries that reflect the 
insurers’ obligation to pay claims in the future. The decision to focus 
on future predicted payments rather than payments actually made in the 
past makes a great deal of sense from a solvency perspective, because an 
insurer’s obligations to pay future claims has a greater impact on the 
solvency of the company than money it already paid. Unfortunately, 
predictions about future claims are subject to a well-documented, but 
complicated and poorly publicized insurance industry business cycle – 
the “underwriting cycle.” This underwriting cycle leads to periodic 
insurance crises that involve rapid increases in predicted losses 
(Baker, 2005b).  Because of this cycle and because of money illusion 
(i.e., the common tendency to forget that a unit of money spent in the 
past had greater value than the same unit of money has today because of 
inflation), it is easy to selectively present the incurred loss 
information in a way that makes it appear as if the civil justice system 
is growing explosively when the reality is that claim payments are 
increasing at about the same rate as inflation. (E.g.,, compare 
Tillinghast Towers-Perrin 2002 with Tillinghast Towers-Perrin 2007.)  
Second, the aggregate premium information does not reveal the price 
for insurance coverage, particularly on an annual basis.2  The 
underwriting cycle affects many aspects of the insurance contract, not 
just price.  Insurance contract terms become more restrictive during a 
hard market and less restrictive over the course of a softening market.  
Because buyers are likely to adjust the amount of coverage that they buy 
in response to the cycle, changes in aggregate premiums on a year-to-
year basis likely understate price changes in any given year.  For 
example, a large increase in the aggregate premiums at the start of the 
____________ 
2 Surveys of insurance prices, such as the annual reports of the 
Medical Liability Monitor, provide useful information, but recent 
research suggests that the “list prices” reported in these surveys 
differ significantly from the prices that actually are paid. (Rodwin 
2008).  
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hard market likely understates the increase in insurance prices, because 
buyers raise their deductibles and decrease their policy limits in 
response to the higher prices.  Moreover, insurance companies may be 
simultaneously introducing more restrictive contract terms, thereby 
reducing the extent of the insurance protection provided.  Similarly, 
stable aggregate premiums during the latter part of a soft market may 
well hide declining prices, even ignoring inflation, as buyers reduce 
deductibles and increase limits in response to a lower price. 
Third, the reports do not provide any information about liabilities 
that are not covered by traditional liability insurance.  Captive 
insurance companies, risk retention groups, and other organizations that 
provide alternatives to traditional insurance are not required to file 
these reports.  Nor are organizations that self-insure through means 
other than captive insurance companies.  As a result, Best’s Aggregates 
and Averages and other compilations of the NAIC data do not provide any 
information about the claims or losses or prices of these alternative 
risk transfer or retention options.  This omission is very significant 
for liabilities that are commonly addressed through alternative risk 
transfer or retention arrangements, such as medical and product 
liabilities.  Moreover, because there is reason to believe that the 
extent of insured losses varies along with the underwriting cycle, 
efforts to measure the civil justice system using the NAIC data are 
likely to present a misleading picture of the rate and direction of 
change.  
D. Public Access to Closed-Claim Reports 
The medical malpractice arena provides an exception to the general 
rule that liability insurance companies do not provide public access to 
their closed-claim reports.  Medical malpractice insurance companies in 
the U.S. are required by law to file two kinds of claim reports:  
• National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). Insurance companies 
and other malpractice payers are required to file reports 
with the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) that provide 
information about any medical malpractice payment made for 
the benefit of a physician, dentist, or other healthcare 
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practitioner (HRSA, 2001).  Reports filed with the NPDB are 
not public.  Nevertheless, the NPDB does release information 
in forms that are useful for research purposes.  It is 
possible to track claim payments by state, specialty, and 
date.  Beginning in 2004 it became possible to track payments 
by type of allegation and injury.3 Unfortunately, the NPDB 
only contains reports for payments made on behalf of 
individual practitioners.  It does not contain reports of 
payments made on behalf of entities such as hospitals or 
urgent care centers.  There are anecdotal reports that 
malpractice claim settlements are sometimes structured so 
that one or more defendant entities pay the entire settlement 
so that no report needs to be filed regarding a practitioner 
defendant.  This possibility compromises the usefulness of 
the NPDB.  Nevertheless, the limited public access to the 
NPDB has enhanced the transparency of the medical malpractice 
aspect of the civil justice system. (E.g., Baicker & Chandra 
2005, Chandra et al 2005, Dhankar et al 2007) 
• State Closed Claim Data. Some states also require medical 
malpractice insurance companies to file individual closed-
claim reports to the insurance regulatory authorities, 
typically for medical liability claims (Cohen and Hughes, 
2007). Two large states – Florida and Texas – have long 
permitted public access to those reports and a third state, 
Missouri, recently opened its database to academic 
researchers.4  Building on that experience, the Statistical 
Information Task force of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners is preparing a model law that would 
provide a framework for more states to collect this 
____________ 
3 http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/pubs/stats/Public_Use_Data_File.pdf 
4 For a recent description of the available researcher access to data on 
medical malpractice claims, see the comments filed by Professor Charles 
Silver and other academics with the NAIC Statistical Information Task 
Force, available at: 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_sitf_070918_med_mal_academia.
pdf 
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information on a more uniform basis.  The current draft of 
the model law applies only to medical liability and it leaves 
open the question of public access. 
In most cases, these regimes were established during highly 
pressured legislative drafting sessions at the height of liability 
insurance crises, without input from civil justice researchers. As a 
result, they have a number of shortcomings, including the following:   
• The information the states collect is not uniform  
• The closed claim report forms often do not require insurers 
to provide information about the severity of the injuries or 
other important claim-specific information  
• Little or no information is collected about claims that are 
closed with no payment or a small payment  
• In some cases there are doubts about the accuracy of the 
information that the insurance companies provide  
• In most cases, the reports must be filed only for medical 
liability claims, and  
• With the notable exceptions of Florida, Texas, and Missouri, 
the states do not permit civil justice researchers to analyze 
the data.  
Yet, despite this gap between the actual and the ideal, the 
mandatory closed-claim reports have made a very substantial contribution 
to knowledge of the medical liability part of the civil justice system.  
Each of the now increasing number of articles published by the research 
teams analyzing the Florida and Texas data has made a significant 
contribution (Black, et al., 2005; Hyman, et al., 2007; Vidmar, et al., 
2005; Vidmar, et al., 2006; Zeiler, et al., 2007).  In many cases, the 
articles demonstrate that a common belief about the civil justice system 
is mistaken.  There is deeply entrenched opposition to this knowledge, 
however, so it is not surprising that this research has not yet changed 
public understanding (Baker, 2005a; Haltom & McCann, 2004).  
Nevertheless, this information has already improved the public policy 
debate by educating journalists and legislators. 
Although accessible insurance company closed-claim reports are not 
a panacea, they offer a an approach to improving the transparency of the 
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civil justice system, particularly if the reporting requirements were 
also imposed on parties that do not buy insurance from entities that are 
subject to the reporting requirements.  In that regard, the NPDB 
represents only a partially successful model.  The NPDB imposes 
reporting obligations on anyone who pays on behalf of a medical 
practitioner, not just insurance companies, but it does not impose any 
reporting obligations for payments on behalf of hospitals and other 
entities. 
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND TRANSPARENCY IN SELECTED CIVIL JUSTICE AREAS 
The preceding section described different ways that civil justice 
researchers can obtain access to liability insurance claims information.  
This section describes how they can find liability insurance information 
about specific kinds of claims:  automobile accidents, medical injuries, 
products injuries, consumer fraud, securities fraud, and, for comparison 
purposes, occupational injuries. There are very substantial differences 
across these fields in the kinds of insurance data that are publicly 
available and, thus, in the degree to which liability insurance promotes 
transparency. 
Automobile Accidents 
Automobile liability claims are the single largest category of tort 
claims in the U.S., reflecting the ubiquity of both the automobile and 
automobile liability insurance. With very limited exceptions, automobile 
liability insurance is mandatory in the U.S.  As a result, liability 
insurance is nearly coextensive with automobile liability and, 
therefore, liability insurance institutions have the potential to 
provide nearly comprehensive data about this part of the civil justice 
system.      
At the aggregate level in the U.S., automobile insurers that are 
subject to the NAIC financial reporting requirements cover the vast 
majority of automobile liabilities.  Thus, the NAIC financial data 
provide a good guide to aggregate developments in auto liability losses 
over time.  While these data are subject to the limitations discussed 
earlier, the underwriting cycle in automobile insurance is less dramatic 
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than in other areas such as medical and products liability  (Baker, 
2004). 
At the individual claim level, companies that provide information 
services to insurers have a very rich and detailed understanding of the 
automobile claim settlement environment.   Although the IRC data are 
expensive, they are available to civil justice researchers, and RAND has 
put them to good use (Carroll and Abrahamse, 2001).  
Thanks to the fieldwork of H. Laurence Ross, civil justice 
researchers once had a detailed understanding of automobile insurance 
claims handling (Ross, 1970).  That fieldwork was carried out in the 
1960s, however, well before the development of call centers, 
computerized claims settlement models, and the other features of the 
contemporary auto-claiming environment.  As a result, it seems quite 
likely that Ross’s description is out of date in important respects. 
Medical Injuries 
In recent years, medical injuries have been subject to intensive 
civil justice research in the U.S. (collected in Baker, 2005a).  For 
example, the extensive closed-claim research has now conclusively 
rejected the charge that medical liability claims are paid in the U.S. 
without regard to the merits of cases (Studdert et al., 2006; Peters, 
2007). Yet key facts about the medical liability landscape in the U.S. 
remain in hot dispute, most significantly facts relating to the severity 
of medical liability claims and to the aggregate financial dimensions of 
medical liability. 
For reasons that are not well documented, a substantial fraction of 
the medical liability risk is spread outside of traditional liability 
insurance institutions or is retained by large health care organizations 
(Tillinghast Towers Perrin, 2007).  As a result, the financial reports 
filed by liability insurance companies do not provide a reliable window 
on the financial dimensions of medical liability risk.  The percentage 
of the medical liability risk that lies outside the reach of traditional 
liability insurance is unknown, and the large price swings that result 
from the insurance underwriting cycle in the medical liability field 
provides reason to believe that there is substantial movement into and 
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out of the traditional liability insurance market over time. (Baker, 
2005b) 
There are no organizations that collect and release medical 
liability information comparable to that collected and released by IRC 
and ISO for automobile accident claims.  As described earlier, some 
states require liability insurers to file closed-claim reports with the 
state insurance departments and the National Practitioner Data Bank 
grants limited public access. But those closed-claim reports are subject 
to the limitations described earlier in this chapter.   
Some medical liability insurance companies have provided civil 
justice researchers with access to their closed-claim files and the 
resulting research has made a substantial contribution to the field 
(e.g., Studdert, et al., 2006).  But due to the highly politicized 
nature of medical liability, insurers have tended to provide access only 
to researchers associated with medical institutions.  This is a concrete 
example of the bias that can result from relying on discretionary access 
to insurance data.5  Most civil justice researchers have been unable to 
gain access to closed-claim files, except through the very limited 
information that is provided to state insurance departments in Florida, 
Texas and, recently, Missouri. If the NAIC Model Law provides for 
researcher access to the closed- claim reports, and if states adopt that 
model law, our understanding of the medical malpractice aspect of the 
civil justice system will be significantly improved. To date, there has 
been no effort to study the handling of medical liability insurance 
claims using qualitative methods comparable to Ross’s study of auto 
liability insurance claims handling.  This would be a worthy area for 
future research. 
Products Injuries 
Liability insurance provides even less systematic information about 
the product injury portion of the civil justice system in the U.S. As 
____________ 
5 Of course, access to medical institutions is much better than no 
access at all.  The professional association of anesthesiologists, for 
example, has used liability insurance claim data as part of a safety 
program that has achieved dramatic reductions in patient injuries. 
(Cooper 2008) 
 - 14 - 
with medical injuries, the insurance underwriting cycle plays a 
significant role in the movement of products risk into and out of 
traditional liability insurance arrangements.  In addition, as with 
medical injuries, a substantial but uncertain portion of the risk is not 
shifted to traditional liability insurance companies that are subject to 
the NAIC financial reporting regime.  For example, there is reason to 
believe that at least a plurality, if not a majority, of pharmaceutical 
liability risks do not purchase traditional liability insurance in the 
U.S. (e.g., Dowding 2006) 
There are additional limits on what can be learned from liability 
insurance information in the products context that go well beyond the 
limits in the medical liability context in the U.S.  First, with the 
possible exception of Texas, there are no mandatory closed-claim 
reporting regimes for products liability that compare to those in the 
medical liability arena. Second, asbestos claims cast a large shadow 
over the products liability that makes it difficult to interpret 
aggregate products liability claiming and payment data.  Third, there is 
reason to believe that manufacturers and other entities with significant 
products liability risk typically purchase liability insurance programs 
with a very substantial “self-insured retention” (essentially, a very 
large deductible), and these entities very often have in-house 
facilities for handling tort claims, or use third-party-claims 
management services, to handle claims within the retention.   
As a result, a substantial but uncertain portion of products 
liability claims against defendants that do purchase traditional 
liability insurance would not be reflected in liability insurance 
company claims or loss data.  Product liability claims that ripen into 
mass torts present additional complications relating to the involvement 
of large numbers of liability insurance policies and liability insurance 
companies, even in cases in which the mass tort actions are directed at 
a single manufacturer. Moreover, in some cases there are very 
significant disputes over the extent to which the claims are covered by 
all or part of the liability insurance program, with the result that 
claims are handled by the defendant manufacturer and the liability 
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insurers pay a lump sum in settlement of their obligations and do not 
maintain claim specific files  (Abraham, 2001).  
Consumer Fraud 
States in the U.S. have enacted a variety of statutory regimes that 
provide liability for consumer fraud.  Because consumer fraud is not 
covered by liability insurance - with the exception of securities fraud, 
which is covered by D&O insurance (Baker & Griffith, 2007) -  liability 
insurance obviously does not provide a window on this aspect of the 
civil justice system.  Other important kinds of civil justice claims 
that fall outside the insurance umbrella are contract claims and claims 
involving real estate transactions.  
Occupational Injuries and Workers Compensation 
Occupational injuries are subject to workers’ compensation laws in 
the U.S., and the vast majority of employees are covered by workers’ 
compensation insurance.  Alhough there are substantial differences in 
the details of workers’ compensation arrangements across states, most of 
these systems include strong reporting requirements that make workers’ 
compensation claim payments more transparent than claim payments in most 
parts of the civil justice system.  However, the administrative nature 
of the formal workers’ compensation claims process is less transparent 
than the formal, court-centered process of the civil justice system.  
Still, because much of the real work of the civil justice system takes 
place in insurance company claim offices and in settlements negotiated 
among the parties, the level of transparency of the two systems may not 
be so different. 
Workers’ compensation insurance claims reporting is governed by 
statistical plans promulgated by the insurance departments of each 
state.  Most of these plans are standardized and administered by the 
National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI).  Pursuant to these 
plans workers’ compensation insurance companies file detailed electronic 
reports at the individual claim level that identify such information as 
the date of the claim, the occupational class of the employer and 
employee, and the incurred loss (incurred loss includes both past and 
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projected future payments).6 In the past the individual claim level data 
has not included the nature of the injury, but that information may be 
collected in the future.  These data are available to researchers, and 
NCCI and other workers compensation experts are notably available to 
talk to researchers through the NCCI Annual Issues Symposium.   
Self-insured workers’ compensation plans are not required to file 
reports with state insurance departments.  They do report some data 
directly to the state workers’ compensation agency, but these data are 
not standardized and aggregated by the NCCI.  As a result, describing 
the aggregate operation of the workers’ compensation requires some 
extrapolation and estimation.  With that said, the available data make 
it possible to describe the workers’ compensation claiming universe more 
accurately and comprehensively than any part of the civil justice 
system, with the possible exception of medical malpractice in Florida, 
Missouri, and Texas.   
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Arguably, liability insurance reduces the transparency of the civil 
justice system by facilitating a private, bureaucratic claim management 
approach to insured liabilities rather than the public, adversarial 
justice approach of the courts.  In my view, a bureaucratic, claims 
management approach would be an inevitable feature of any functioning 
civil justice system in a mass-market economy.  Others may disagree, 
but, as a practical matter, changing to a more individualized justice 
approach would require a commitment of such vast public resources that 
such a change lies outside the scope of the immediate public policy 
debate.   
With that said, there is no reason why the presently private nature 
of claims management cannot be brought into public view, though that 
result cannot be accomplished without government action.   As noted 
earlier, insurance is a very competitive business, and superior 
information about claims can provide a competitive advantage to larger 
____________ 
6 The NCCI information is based on a telephone interview with Barry 
Llewellyn of NCCI, together with information gathered from the NCCI 
website:  www.ncci.com. 
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insurers.  It is not in their interest to share that information with 
potential competitors, and we cannot expect them to do so voluntarily.  
With the exception of the auto claims data provided by the Insurance 
Research Bureau, all of the most important sources of data described in 
this chapter are the result of government mandates.   
The NCCI-administered workers’ compensation claims reporting 
system, the NPDB, and the medical malpractice closed-claims reporting 
systems in Texas, Florida, and Missouri provide models on which to 
build.  In adapting those systems to better serve transparency goals, it 
would be essential to bring civil justice researchers who have worked 
with those systems into the process.   
The current NAIC effort to prepare a model medical malpractice 
claims reporting law is one such example, though it is too soon to tell 
whether the medical and insurance industries will succeed in their 
efforts to deny public access to the closed claim reports.7 Like many 
such NAIC efforts, the medical malpractice model law drafting process 
appears to have been dominated by insurance industry interests,8 perhaps 
because of the inevitable tendency for specialist regulators to begin to 
see the world through the eyes of the high-status people whom they 
regulate (Randall, 1999).  For that reason, and because of the 
significance of uninsured liabilities in fields such as medical 
malpractice and products liability, efforts to create truly transparent 
claim reporting systems should be informed by the insurance industry and 
insurance industry regulators, but should not take place within the 
field of insurance regulation.  
The NPDB, which was established by federal legislation, provides a 
partially successful model, subject to the important caveat regarding 
the lack of reporting obligations for defendants other than doctors. The 
____________ 
7 The current draft of the proposed Model Law and comments and other 
information can be accessed at: 
http://www.naic.org/committees_c_sitf.htm 
 
8 For example, as of the time of this writing the NAIC working 
group had decided to draft the model law so that it does not require 
insurers to file reports on “no payment” cases despite the fact that the 
State of Missouri has done so in the past with no apparent negative 
impact on the liability insurance industry in Missouri. 
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NPDB does not contain records of payments by hospitals and other entity 
defendants.  This reporting differential skews the transparency provided 
by the NPDB in two ways.  First, there is the obvious consequence that 
the NPDB only provides a partial view into medical malpractice payments.  
Second, in cases with both an entity defendant and an individual 
defendant, there is an incentive to craft the settlement so that the 
entity, but not the doctor, pays.  This incentive is particularly strong 
in situations in which the doctor and the entity have the same insurance 
arrangements.  Any effort to increase transparency in the future must be 
crafted to avoid such gaps in reporting obligations.  Other limitations 
of the NPDB include the reporting of claim payment amounts by dollar 
ranges rather than absolute amounts (which makes statistical analysis 
more difficult) and the lack of standardized injury severity information 
such as the 9 point scale developed by the NAIC. 
CONCLUSION: LIMITS ON TRANSPARENCY THROUGH LIABILITY INSURANCE 
This chapter has described some of the main ways that liability 
insurance data and institutions contribute to the transparency of the 
civil justice system.  Because this contribution differs substantially 
across lines of insurance and because some liabilities are not insured 
at all, aggregate liability insurance data do not provide a reliable 
guide to the size or scope of the civil justice system as a whole.  At 
best, the data provide a guide to the portions of that system that 
involve commonly insured liabilities.  As illustrated in this chapter, 
the extent to which they provide a reliable guide differs significantly 
from one type of liability to another. 
The single best way to improve the transparency of the civil 
justice system would be to expand mandatory claim level reporting along 
the lines suggested in this chapter.  These reporting requirements would 
impose a burden on the liability insurance industry. They would also 
impose a burden on the large organizations that use alternative risk 
transfer and retention mechanism.  These burdens are worth imposing for 
at least two reasons.  First, civil justice transparency is a valuable 
public good.  Second, the liability insurance industry and other large 
organizations have been vigorous supporters of restrictive civil justice 
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reform, in part based on unverified claims about the wasteful costs that 
civil justice institutions impose on U.S. society.  It is reasonable to 
require organizations that make such claims to provide public access to 
the data that are required to evaluate them. 
*  *  * 
In concluding, it is worth noting that this chapter provides yet 
another illustration of how liability insurance complicates the ability 
to observe the civil justice system. There is no “pure” civil justice 
system that liability insurance can help us observe.  Liability 
insurance transforms civil justice claims even as it helps make them 
more observable.  Liability claims are shaped to match the available 
liability insurance, with the result that “exclusions in liability 
insurance policies create, in effect, remote islands of tort liability 
that lawyers and law professors know about, but almost no one goes to 
visit.” (Baker 2006 at 7)  Liability insurance transforms claims against 
individuals into de facto claims against massively repeat players – 
insurance companies. Liability insurance limits are de facto caps on 
damages.  Liability insurance claims personnel transform some complex 
liability rules into simpler, more administrable rules of thumb. And 
negotiations over the boundaries of liability insurance – who is 
obligated to buy liability insurance, in what amounts, and against which 
liabilities – amount to negotiations over the boundaries of the civil 
justice system itself. (Id.)  
There is no system of civil justice that liability insurance 
institutions can help us observe without transforming that system. As 
Kenneth Abraham has compellingly documented, “The tort system, not only 
as it exists on paper but also how it works in practice, is a product of 
the insurance system, just as the insurance system is a product of the 
tort system.” (Abraham 2008 at 1).   
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